On 26 April, the State Duma adopted the new version of Russia's basic electoral rights law in its second of three readings. In general, the additions to the law reflect the positions of Central Electoral Commission Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov. If adopted, the bill could strengthen the hand of the federal government in regional elections. It could also prevent some of the abuses that now take place.

One of the most radical changes the bill will introduce if enacted as law is the election of no less than half of the members of regional legislatures on the basis of party-list voting. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Union of Right-wing Forces, and Yabloko strongly backed this innovation. The State Duma had introduced a similar provision to the federal law defining regional political institutions on 10 April, but the Federation Council vetoed that bill on 24 April. One of the main reasons the Federation Council rejected the change was because the amendment called for a two- month deadline in bringing regional legislation into line with the new federal provisions.

In drafting the electoral law, the main dispute was over how quickly party-list voting would be introduced into the regional legislatures. Ultimately, the date of 14 July 2003, the end of the transitional period set by the new law on political parties, won out with the support of the centrist factions in the Duma and the Central Electoral Commission.

If regional legislatures are elected on the basis of party-list voting and the new law on political parties succeeds in reducing the number of parties to three or four, it would be easier for Moscow- based officials to control regional legislation and budgets. Moscow-based parties would gain political influence that they do not presently wield because deputies elected on the basis of party lists would give the regional legislatures much greater party structure. Additionally, since party leaders are based in the capital, even if they are not loyal to the Kremlin, the president might be able to exert more influence over them than he currently does over the regional legislatures. The Kremlin currently has little influence in regional legislatures because there are simply too many deputies and no real parties to work with. Governors are generally wary of the adoption of party-list voting for regional legislatures because it would weaken their influence over the legislatures and strengthen the hand of the federal government. However, in the case of Pskov, the governor actively pushed such an innovation because he thought that it would help him gain greater control over the legislature (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 6, 2002).

A second innovation is the requirement that governors' elections take place in two rounds. This provision is aimed at unpopular governors who try to improve their chances of winning a second term by limiting the elections to one round in the hopes that their opponents will split the anti-governor vote, allowing the incumbent to stay on with relatively little popular support (as in the case of Pskov Oblast). According to Rostislav Turovskii, the power of the protest vote was more pronounced in the first round of gubernatorial elections that took place in 1996-1997, than in the elections that occurred in 2000- 2002, though in some cases it still worked (see review of Turovskii's book elsewhere in this issue).

Third, the bill sets a "framework" for minimal turnout at 20 percent, down from the usual 25 percent now. Repeat and additional elections will be valid no matter how many people actually participate in them. The regions can even abolish all minimal turnout requirements for local elections. The Duma working group led by Communist Deputy Aleksandr Salii wanted to limit the ability to raise the minimum turnout threshold to the federal government, but the Central Electoral Commission changed the text so that regional legislatures can increase the minimal required turnout if they so desire. Regions like Primorskii Krai have had trouble electing regional and local legislatures due to low turnout.

Fourth, the Central Electoral Commission resisted pressure from the working group and stood by its insistence on allowing itself the right to nominate chairmen of the regional electoral commissions. The only concession the Commission made was that it gave up the right to appoint the chairman if its choice had been rejected twice by the regional commissioners.

The purpose of this reform was to make the regional electoral commission less dependent on the regional authorities. However, the lawmakers kept basically intact the 1994 system by which the regional executive and legislative branches each nominate half of the regional electoral commission members. Because of this system, the electoral commissions are dependent on the governors in most regions. The Central Electoral Commission blocked a proposal from Yabloko to give the regional legislatures the sole right to name the members of the commissions. Veshnyakov warned that the Federation Council would veto the law if the governors' position in the regional electoral commissions were thus weakened. Earlier proposals had suggested giving the Central Electoral Commission the ability to appoint one third of the members of the regional electoral commissions. This idea was dropped, however.

Fifth, the bill shortens the list of reasons for which a candidate can be refused registration or have his registration withdrawn. This provision would have had an important impact on the recent elections in Ingushetiya, where the leading candidate was removed from the race two days before the first round of voting (see article elsewhere in this issue). According to the bill, violating general campaign procedures and presenting incomplete information about the candidates' income and property will no longer be grounds for removal from the race. If the bill were adopted, the electoral commission would simply publicize the fact that the candidate presented incorrect information about his income rather than disqualifying him. Prohibitions on propaganda using social, racial, national, or religious differences would remain intact and could be grounds for removal. According to the bill, only the court, not the regional or central electoral commissions, could cancel a candidate's registration even if it can be demonstrated that the candidate was registered by mistake or in violation of the law. Only electoral commissions and candidates could appeal to the court to have a candidate's registration canceled. According to the bill, an appeal to remove a candidate could be made no later than eight days before an election and the court would have to rule no later than five days before the election. Changes in the Civil Code would be required to ensure that the court acts so quickly.

The State Duma expects to approve the bill in its third reading in May. Then it will go to the Federation Council and president before becoming a law.

Arkadii Lyubarev in Moscow

Published in Russian Regional Report, Vol. 7, No. 16, 8 May 2002

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